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Since its introduction in 2008, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) has
been the subject of much criticism and concern that the mechanisms for assessing
claims are unjust. Some of this criticism has been backed up by the first independent
review of the assessment process. Thirty years ago Mashaw argued that models
of justice could be used to identify “those qualities of a decision process that
provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions”.1 Based on a small piece
of empirical research amongst welfare rights advisers, this article uses Mashaw’s
framework to examine the groundswell of opinion that decision-making in ESA is
unacceptable.
Introduction
Following concerns about increasing numbers of people claiming Incapacity
Benefit, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) was introduced in 2008 for
new claims.2 There were two policy intentions: to reduce the number of successful
claims and to introduce to a new element of conditionality so that most of those
who qualified would be expected to make efforts to return to the labour market.
Although there was some cautious welcome of the principle that people with health
problems should not be “written off”, policy analysts predicted that the key
problems with ESA would be with this conditionality.3 However, experience of
the early implementation of the system has shown that overwhelming numbers of
people are failing to qualify for the benefit at all. Statistics show that, of completed
*The author would like to thank the fourteen organisations which took part in this research, the Socio-Legal Studies
Association for providing funding for the expenses involved in this project, andMichael Adler for his helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
1 J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983).
2ESA initially applied only to new claims but, starting with a series of pilots in October 2010, all existing claims
for Incapacity Benefit will be transferred to ESA.
3E.g. M. Adler, “The Justice Implications of Activation Policies in the UK” in T. Erhag, S. Stendhal and S. Devetzi
(eds) A EuropeanWork-First Welfare State (Goteborg: University of Goteborg: Centre for European Research, 2008);
C. Bambra and K. E. Smith “‘No Longer Deserving? Sickness Benefit Reform and the Politics of (Ill) Health in the
UK” (2010) 20 Critical Public Health 71–84; N. Barker and S. Lamble “From Social Security to Individual
Responsibility: Sanctions, Conditionality and Punitiveness in the Welfare Reform Bill 2009 (Part One) — Current
Developments” (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 321–32; D. Bonner, “Employment and Support
Allowance: Helping the Sick and Disabled to Return to Work?” (2008) 15 J.S.S.L. 123–50; N. Harris “Reducing
Dependency? Conditional Rights, Benefit Reform and Drugs” (2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society; R. Sainsbury
“Administrative Justice, Discretion and the ‘Welfare toWork’ Project” (2008) 4 Journal of Social Welfare and Family
Law 30, 323–38.
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claims, 34 per cent of people were awarded benefit, while the remaining 66 per
cent were found fit for work.4 This suggests that the most contentious aspect of
ESA, so far, has not been with the new conditionality but with the initial assessment
of “capacity for work”. Third sector organisations have been vocal in their criticism
of ESA assessments5 and the first independent review of the assessment procedure
has confirmed that there are many problems with it.6
It is not surprising that large numbers of people have failed to qualify for ESA,
since this was the policy intention. However, criticism of the implementation of
ESA suggests that the mechanisms for assessing claims do not appear “fair”. Given
these criticisms, it is useful to consider assessments for ESA using “models of
justice” as described by Mashaw7 and developed more recently by Adler8 and
Sainsbury.9 Theoretical interest in models of justice dates back to Mashaw’s work
in the early 1980s. In his book, Bureaucratic Justice, Mashaw attempted to
understand why it was that people criticised the American disability benefits system
for being “unjust”. He found that people criticized the system for different reasons
and suggested that models of administrative justice would show that these different
viewpoints reflect different normative values. Systems of administration could be
judged by reference to “moral judgement”, “professional” or “bureaucratic”models
of administrative justice. Mashaw argued that the moral judgement model would
hold up the values of fairness, objectivity and the independent weighing-up of
potentially contradictory evidence, values usually found in courts and legal
procedures. The professional model would hold up values usually to be found in
the fields of professional practice where the focus would be on therapy and support
for individual clients and concerned with discretionary judgements about matters
that are inherently uncertain. The bureaucratic model of justice, on the other hand,
would be concerned with consistency of decisions across many cases and would
hold up values of efficiency and accuracy, requiring cost-effective decision-making
and reliance on technocratic distinctions between true and false claims. Mashaw
argued that these models of justice were competitive: promoting the values inherent
in one would be at the expense of values inherent in another. This, he argued, could
help us to understand the different types of criticism levied at the US disability
benefit system at that time, but could also be applied to other aspects of public
administration. Adler’s more recent reworking of these models extended them to
reflect the changes in public administration from professionalism and bureaucracy
to the new managerialism of the 1990s, adding “managerialist”, “consumerist”
and “market” models to Mashaw’s original three.10 Adler’s version of the models
4DWP statistical release, October 2010. Available at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/esa_wca/esa_wca
_26102010.pdf [accessed January 2011].
Note that these figures do not include a further 36 per cent of all claims which are “closed before assessment”,
some of which relate to short-term illness but also include others where claimants have failed to provide information
or attend medical examinations.
5K. Dryburgh, Unfit for Purpose: Evidence on Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) from Scottish Citizens
Advice Bureaux (Edinburgh: Citizens Advice Scotland, 2010); S. Royston, Not Working: CAB Evidence on the ESA
Work Capability Assessment (London: Citizens Advice, 2010); DWP, The Work Capability Assessment: A Call for
Evidence (London: DWP 2010).
6M.Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment (London: The Stationery Office, 2010),
p.6.
7 J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983).
8M. Adler, “Fairness in Context.” (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society: 615–38.
9R. Sainsbury, “Administrative Justice, Discretion and the ‘Welfare to Work’ Project”.
10M. Adler, “Fairness in Context”.
70 Journal of Social Security Law
(2011) 18 J.S.S.L., Issue 2 © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
of justice renamed the “moral judgement” model as a “legal” model, reflecting the
legal values inherent in the model. Adler’s discussion of models of justice also
shows how each model of justice is typically associated with a different mode of
redress. Sainsbury’s critique of Adler argues that Mashaw’s original models are
still valid and that the managerial changes of recent years can still be encompassed
by the bureaucratic model, particularly in relation to social security. Sainsbury
agrees with Adler, however, that looking at different modes of redress can help
our understanding of models of justice.11
Mashaw said that models of justice could be used to identify “those qualities of
a decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions”.12
This article uses Mashaw’s framework to examine the groundswell of opinion that
decision-making in ESA may not be acceptable. The article looks first of all at the
history of assessing capacity for work in the UK and the changes brought about
by ESA, arguing that, while assessments have become increasingly bureaucratic,
they are underpinned by inherent moral claims. Following a description of the
empirical research behind it, the article moves on to look at criticisms of
decision-making in ESA. It then considers two grievance mechanisms available
to dissatisfied claimants: appeals and complaints procedures, which exemplify
different models of justice. Finally, the article considers recent policy developments
and concludes that, while decision-making in ESA clearly represents a bureaucratic
model of justice and can be criticised from either a professional or legal perspective,
it may fail even in its own bureaucratic terms.
Assessing capacity for work in the UK social security system
Incapacity benefits in the UK are determined within a framework of rules and
without a specific limit on budgets. Traditionally, claimants of incapacity benefits
have had to satisfy two types of test in order to qualify for benefits: a test of their
“incapacity for work” and an assessment of their eligibility for the benefit, based
either on national insurance contributions or on means-testing.13 So long as these
two sets of rules are satisfied, then claimants are entitled to statutorily defined
levels of benefit and have rights of appeal against refusal to an independent tribunal,
introducing elements of legalism to the process. This article focuses on the first
of these tests, relating to whether the claimant is incapable of work.
Until the 1990s, assessment of claims for, the then-named, Invalidity Benefit,
relied mainly on assessments by GPs, backed up by checks by the Benefits Agency
Medical Service in cases where there was doubt. The assessment of capacity for
work was based on an assessment of the claimant’s ability to do a real job “having
regard to age, education, experience, state of health and other personal factors”
confirmed by a Commissioner’s decision, R(S)11/1951. The first major change to
this system came in 1995 when Invalidity Benefit was replaced by Incapacity
Benefit, bringing in the “All Work Test” which relied instead on a medical
assessment by a Benefits Agency doctor, using a system to allocate points for
different levels of impairment and a minimum threshold which claimants had to
11R. Sainsbury, “Administrative Justice, Discretion and the ‘Welfare to Work’ Project”.
12 J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, p.24.
13ESA, like its predecessor, Incapacity Benefit, has both contributory andmeans-tested elements but the assessments
of “incapacity for work” are the same for both elements.
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reach to qualify. This test was criticised at the time for focussing on medical
assessment of impairment and not on the day-to-day realities of claimants’ lives.14
Recognising some of the problems with the test, some minor changes were made
to the assessment for mental health and it was rebranded the “Personal Capability
Assessment” in 2000, but the principles of a points system remained. Around the
same time, the task of carrying out medical assessments for Incapacity Benefit
was outsourced to a private company, now Atos Healthcare.
ESA kept these principles but with a tightening of the criteria for the now
renamed “Work Capability Assessment” (WCA) and a reduction in the range of
conditions which lead to exemption from the medical test.15 The WCA has an
additional function: instead of distinguishing between claimants who are “fit for
work” and those who are not, it is used to classify claimants in one of three ways:
as “fit for work” and therefore not eligible for ESA, as having “limited capacity
for work” and therefore subject to conditionality in work activity, or as having
“limited capacity for work-related activity” with no conditionality attached.16 The
WCA is similar to the previous Personal Capability Assessment in that it is based
on a series of “descriptors” which outline a range of functional impairments (either
physical or mental). Each descriptor carries a range of points (between 6 and 15)
which, if they add up to 15 or more, classify a claimant as having “limited capability
for work”.17 The WCA has tightened the descriptors severely in order to raise the
level of impairment necessary to qualify for the benefit.18 Another change brought
in at the same time as ESA was a change to the medical assessment procedure
where doctors carried out assessments to one where assessments are carried out
by “approved health care professionals”: doctors, nurses and physiotherapists who
are required to have at least three years experience and who are required to take
part in specific training provided by Atos. All professionals must also be approved
by the Chief Medical Adviser to the DWP.
Capacity for work and moral claims
Discourse on assessments of capacity for work in the UK social security system,
has centred on improving the “objectivity” of assessment procedures, with attempts
to move away from GPs’ alleged subjective assessments to mechanisms which
can provide more technocratic and scientific decisions. Research on the GP’s role
in assessing capacity for work shows that doctors do not find such an assessment
14Disability Alliance, Response to “A Consultation on the Medical Assessment for Incapacity Benefit” (London:
Disability Alliance Educational Research Association, 1994).
15Under Incapacity Benefit, a list of health conditions, including certain physical impairments, being registered
blind, having a “severe mental impairment” and being in receipt of the higher rate of Disability Living Allowance
Care Component led to exemption from medical assessment. Under ESA this list has been drastically reduced to
include essentially only people diagnosed with a terminal illness, people receiving certain types of chemotherapy and
hospital inpatients. (The Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/794), reg.20).
16Welfare Reform Act 2007 s.9.
17The Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/794), Sch.2.
18For further details of the introduction of theWCA and how it differs from the PCA see D. Bonner, “Employment
and Support Allowance: Helping the Sick and Disabled to Return to Work?” (2008) 15 J.S.S.L. 123–50.
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so simple, highlighting the complexity of the task and the uncertainty inherent in
professional decision-making.19 This is what we would expect from Mashaw’s
description of a professional model of administrative justice.
When we look at the introduction of the first “all work” test for Incapacity
Benefit in 1995, we can see that the test was one which identified people with
particular levels of impairment. It was not a measure of “employability” as such
but was designed explicitly to identify people whose impairments suggested that
it would not be reasonable to expect them to work, as described by the Department
of Social Security at the time: “the point at which a person should not be expected
to work for benefit purposes”.20 This is still the basic principle which applies under
ESA, with the legislation stating that the purpose of the WCA is to assess, on the
one hand, whether a person’s capability of work is “limited” and, on the other,
whether “it is not reasonable to require him to work”.21
However, this is quickly translatable into a discourse of objectivity which implies
that those who “pass” the test are honest and deserving of social support, while
those who “fail” the test are undeserving. This rhetoric of morality has carried
through to the media reaction to assessment which has included headlines such as
“Three-quarters of those claiming to be too sick to work are in fact fit and able to
look for a job”22 or “A shameful 78 per cent of people who applied for a new sick
benefit were fit to work, tests have revealed”.23 These media reactions stress the
scientific nature of the ESA assessment and imply that those who fail this scientific
test are therefore undeserving. This reaction is not surprising and was predicted
by some writers in advance of the implementation of ESA.24
Policy makers’ discourse is more circumspect but is encased in a language of
“rescuing” claimants from dependence on state benefits. For example, statistics
showing that most claimants failed to qualify for ESA were accompanied by a
press release with the headline: “New figures show thousands stopped from getting
trapped on sickness benefit”,25 while a recent statement from the Employment
Minister stated that the medical tests were about “saving lives not saving money”.26
These moral claims in relation to ESA are important in understanding the validity
of decision-making processes, since they have such clear resonances in popular
and policy-making circles.
Themain principle behind the ESA assessment process is to create a bureaucratic
mechanism which efficiently distinguishes between eligible and non-eligible
claims, following clearly in Mashaw’s model of bureaucratic rationality and,
increasingly, since the 1990s, sidelining elements of professional judgement. The
19M.Berg, K. Horstman, S. Plass andM. van Heusden, “Guidelines, Professionals and the Production of Objectivity:
Standardisation and the Professionalism of Insurance Medicine” (2000) 22 Sociology of Health and Illness 765–91;
D. Cohen, M. Aylward, and S. Rollnick, “Inside the Fitness for Work Consultation: A Qualitative Study” (2009)
Occupational Medicine; S. Hussey, P. Hoddinott, P. Wilson, and J. Dowell, “Sickness Certification System in the
United Kingdom: Qualitative Study of Views of General Practitioners in Scotland” (2004) 328 BritishMedical Journal
(2004).
20Department of Social Security, The Medical Assessment for Incapacity Benefit (London: HMSO, 1994), p.35.
21Welfare Reform Act 2007 s.8(1).
22 The Telegraph, July 28, 2010, my emphasis.
23 The Sun, October 27, 2010, my emphasis.
24C. Bambra, and K. E. Smith. “No Longer Deserving? Sickness Benefit Reform and the Politics of (Ill) Health
in the UK”; C. Grover and L. Piggott “From Incapacity Benefit to Employment and Support Allowance: Social
Sorting, Sickness and Impairment, and Social Security” (2010) 31 Policy Studies 265–82.
25DWP press release, October 13, 2009.
26 The Telegraph, November 23, 2010.
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values inherent in professional judgement remain theoretically in the role of the
GP in verifying the initial claim and in the role of the medical assessor. The values
inherent in the legal model of justice can be found in the appeals procedure where
claimants can appeal to an independent tribunal.
Research methodology
The research which has informed this article was a small scoping study on the
early experiences of people claiming ESA. It focussed on the experiences of welfare
rights advisers who have a front-line role in advising claimants about ESA. Their
experiences provide a useful overview of the issues, while providing in-depth
information on the everyday experiences of claimants. The research involved
qualitative interviews with 18 advice workers from 14 organisations during June
and July 2010. Organisations were identified using a snowballing technique to
include a range of types of agency, including those that specialised in advising
particular client groups and those with expertise in appeals work. Eleven of these
agencies were local advice agencies based in different areas of Scotland and
providing direct advice to the public. They included citizens’ advice bureaux, local
authority welfare rights advice teams, housing associations and voluntary sector
organisations. Some organisations provided a generalist service while others
specialised in advising particular groups such as lone parents, homeless people,
people with learning disabilities, hospital patients, people with particular health
conditions or people with mental health problems. Three interviews were also
carried out with national organisations which have a “second tier” advice or policy
role. Information was also gathered from reports published on the websites of
national campaigning organisations, from responses to the call for evidence for
the Harrington Review of theWork Capability Assessment, from policy documents
and from attendance at a conference organised by the Child Poverty Action Group.
Interviews were based on a broad interview topic guide, were fully transcribed
and analysed using a thematic analysis with the aid of NVivo software. The
Harrington Review, published in November 2010, has provided additional material
for this article.
The role of advisors in supporting claims for ESA
It is well established that those who seek advice about welfare problems are in the
minority and that there are many more who either try to resolve problems on their
own or put up with problems without taking action.27 Advisers in this study were
well aware of this problem and expressed considerable concern about the people
who were not seeking advice. Since their own experience was that many claimants
would only qualify for the benefit with professional help, they believed that there
must be many others who were being left unsupported and not receiving the benefit
they were entitled to. Their concern was that the system had been designed in such
as way as to produce too many wrong decisions which could only be corrected on
appeal. One adviser summed this position up as follows:
27H. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Think and Do About Going to Law (Oxford: Hart, 1999); H. Genn, P.
Pleasence, N. Balmer, A. Buck, and A. O’Grady, Understanding Advice Seeking Behaviour: Further Findings from
the LSRC Survey of Justiciable Problems (London: Legal Services Research Centre, 2004).
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“[the procedure]’s completely unreliable. The processes aren’t there. It’s only
intervention that gets the right decision. If they don’t have support there must
be people who don’t get anything. It’s a sham assessment process.” [interview
1]
Although many advice agencies rely on a reactive approach, where they see only
people who seek advice, some of the advisers in this study, who worked for smaller
specialist agencies, felt that their clients would come to see them whenever they
got a letter from the DWP or if their benefit stopped. In these cases, advisers were
fairly confident that they were seeing most of the people within their remit.
Advisers in this study helped people at every stage of their claims: from advising
about initial claims, through helping with filling in claim forms, explaining letters
from the DWP, attending the medical assessments, advising about decision letters
and the options available to those refused the benefit, to drafting appeals, collecting
additional evidence and representing at tribunal hearings. At every stage in this
process, advisers emphasised claimants’ confusion and stress as to what was
happening to them and their own role in helping to ease this. This help ranged
from explaining more clearly to claimants what their position was, as many
claimants were very confused, to technical advice relating to getting medical
evidence through the legal aid system and representing at tribunal hearings. They
particularly stressed their role in explaining the complexities of the benefits system
and claimants’ confusion about the relationship between ESA, Jobseeker’s
Allowance, Disability LivingAllowance and other benefits such as Housing Benefit.
However, their main role was in assisting claimants to present their case, either at
the initial claim stage or at appeal, by helping people to show how their daily lives
could be matched to the descriptors in the ESA legislation. Advisers stressed that
they were attempting to get correct decisions: they were not encouraging claimants
to lie or distort the truth. They were trying to counteract a flawed assessment
system which is making costly mistakes, both in terms of Jobcentre Plus and
Tribunals Service time and in terms of the claimants’ health and well-being:
“They [tribunal representatives] are just righting a wrong, that’s the thing
about it, they’re not getting people who shouldn’t be on the benefits onto the
benefits, they’re actually showing that these people should have got the points
that would have allowed them to stay on that benefit, but the system itself
now recognises that these people are unfit for work using quite a tough points
system.” [interview 2]
As well as their concerns about the regulations for ESA and the way in which
assessments were being carried out, advisers were also concerned about the
day-to-day administration of the benefit. They emphasised their own “legal”
knowledge of the system by giving examples of mistakes made by frontline
Jobcentre Plus staff:
“The system has to work by the rules and how they [Jobcentre Plus] need to
operate, and it really struck home that they just don’t know. And I’ve had a
lot of cases and they just don’t know what they’re doing. They don’t.”
[interview 2]
Ticking boxes: decision-making in Employment and Support Allowance 75
(2011) 18 J.S.S.L., Issue 2 © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
Advisers therefore saw their responsibility as helping people to navigate their way
through a flawed system, using their specialist “legal” knowledge, and were
concerned that claimants without access to such advice would be left helpless and
without access to legitimate financial support.28
Decision-making in ESA
The decision on individual claims for ESA is made by a decision-maker based at
Jobcentre Plus, based on the evidence included in the claim. This evidence should
include the claim form (ESA 50), the GP certificate, the report of the Atos medical
examination and any other additional evidence submitted by the claimant. Advisers
believed that decisions were being made solely on the basis of the Atos medical
assessments, which describe which descriptors are met by the claimant. If the
number of points awarded comes to less than 15 then claimants are found fit for
work. The advisers did not believe that decision-makers take any other evidence
into account or that they would ever consider doubting the medical assessment.
Many advisers gave examples of this, such as:
“The decisionmakers are just going on what the healthcare professional says.
I’ve got this woman who’s on methadone and the final conclusion was that
she had no drug problem. I don’t see how that decision could have been made
if they’d read the ESA 50 or the doctor’s certificate.” [interview 1]
There is a second opportunity for re-assessment by decision-makers if claimants
appeal the decision. Most advisers believed that few decisions, if any, are revised
by Jobcentre Plus before going to a full tribunal hearing, arguing that
decision-makers would stick by the Atos report, whatever further evidence was
submitted. The following adviser thought that its status as a “medical” report made
it more valuable than anything else that the claimant might submit:
“I think they’ve been told because it’s based on a medical examination finding
that that’s the best evidence there is.” [interview 6]
However, one adviser, who worked primarily with homeless people who often
had mental health problems and/or addiction problems, had found that the
decision-makerswould reverse decisions before going to a tribunal if he submitted
the right kind of evidence. Another described how on one occasion, appalled at
the initial decision, he took matters more directly into his own hands:
“I contacted her GP who went ballistic. They all [various specialists] sent me
reports, I took them next door to the Job Centre and said ‘I’m going on holiday
today, I’m back a week on Monday, I expect to see her found unfit for work
and on the support group by a week on Monday.’ And give them their due,
when I went back a week on Monday she was on the support group.”
[interview 9]
28This article does not address the question of what happens to people who ultimately fail to qualify for ESA
although this was explored with advisers, who expressed considerable concern about this group.
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The generality of advice workers’ experience was that such revisions are rare and
that the Atos medical assessment takes priority over all other types of evidence.
These views are corroborated by third sector organisations responding to the
Harrington Review of the Work Capability Assessment, for example by the
Disability Alliance:
“We believe that DWP decision-makers should be encouraged to give greater
weight to evidence from a person’s own GP and/or consultant rather than
solely the brief WCA.”29
and by MIND:
“The issues with the Atos assessors are particularly important because of the
high regard in which their verdicts are apparently held by the Jobcentre Plus
Decision Makers, who have the final say over which group an applicant is
placed in. These DecisionMakers are supposed to take all available evidence
into account but seem to usually simply accept the recommendation of the
Atos assessor.”30
Statistical reports from the DWP indicate that it is unlikely that decision-makers
would come to a different conclusion from the Atos report:
“In some cases the JCP Decision Maker’s final decision may differ from the
Atos recommendation or the case may be returned to Atos for reconsideration.
This change makes a very small difference to the published figures.”31
The Harrington Review confirms that, in the vast majority of cases (98 per cent),
Jobcentre Plus decision-makers follow the advice of the Atos assessment32 and
reaffirms the view that “It is important to note that the advice from the Atos
assessment to the Decision Maker is just advice”.33 The Review concludes that the
problem lies with a lack of confidence amongst decision-makers to challenge the
views of Atos assessors and recommends “empowering” decision-makers to make
better decisions, through training and confidence building.34
The actions of decision-makers are a good example of Mashaw’s description
of bureaucratic rationality, where the system encourages decision-makers to attempt
to simplify and routinise decisions. The evidence produced by the medical
assessment is more highly valued because it can be easily assimilated into
quantifiable “objective” facts and also has the additional moral status of “medical”
and therefore “scientific” evidence. This contrasts strongly with evidence provided
by the claimants themselves, for example on the ESA 50 form, which is regarded
as subjective and untrustworthy. The evidence provided by GPs, while having the
moral status of “medical” evidence, does not have the strength of that provided
by the “objective” Atos test. Harrington’s solution to the apparent problem is to
improve decision-making through training, rather than to question the difficult
29Disability Alliance, The Work Capability Assessment Independent Review Call for Evidence Disability Alliance
Response (London: Disability Alliance, 2010), response to question 5.
30MIND,Work Capability Assessment - Independent Review Response from Mind (2010), p.6.
31DWP statistical release, October 2010, p.6, available at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/esa_wca/esa
_wca_26102010.pdf [accessed January 2011].
32M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.48.
33M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.45.
34M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.53.
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issue of how to weigh up different types of evidence. Sainsbury reminds us that
assessments of fairness in administrative decision-making depends on how far we
trust the decision-makers.35 He argues that we are more likely to accept decisions
made by professionals because they are professionals, while we are less likely to
accept bureaucratic decisions, which do not carry the same level of respect. In the
case of ESA, which depends on a medical judgment, the bureaucratic processmay
be acceptable so long as it relies on trustworthy professional judgements at the
assessment stage. This leads us to consider how the evidence provided by Atos,
which is so highly regarded by decision-makers, is created.
Medical Assessments
By far the biggest criticism of ESA held by advisers lay with the medical
assessments carried out by Atos Healthcare. Their opinion of the assessments was
that they are perfunctory, inadequate and that they fail to take account of the
claimant’s own account of their problems or of any supporting evidence provided
by GPs or other professionals. Many gave examples of cases where they had been
astonished at the contrast between the Atos medical report’s assessment of the
claimant compared with what they knew about the person’s health problems.
Explanations for the inadequacy of the assessments concerned the qualifications
and expertise of assessors and the “tick box” approach to assessment, whereby
assessors follow computerized forms and do not spend sufficient time with
claimants.
Qualifications and expertise of assessors
The introduction of ESA changed the assessment procedure from one that was
carried out by doctors to one which uses “approved health care professionals”.
While these professionals are expected to have a minimum level of qualifications
and experience, advisers were concerned at assessors’ apparent lack of appropriate
qualifications and training. Many described cases where assessments of people
with severe mental illnesses or addictions were made by assessors with no expertise
in this area:
“It used to be doctors. I initially got the impression that if there were mental
health problems you would get a doctor but that doesn’t seem to be happening.
Even with the mental health problems it seems to be a nurse” [interview 1]
“We’ve got nurses who are not qualified in mental health doing full mental
health assessments including things that are quite breathtaking in our view,
for example, we’ll see a client who does have a CPN36 allocated to them and
the [Atos] nurse concluding and giving an opinion in the report that their
condition is ‘mild’.” [interview 2]
35R. Sainsbury, “Administrative justice, discretion and the ‘welfare to work’ project”, p.326.
36Community psychiatric nurse.
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In contrast, one adviser who specialized in advising people with learning disabilities
commented on the appropriate experience of the assessor on one occasion, stressing
that this case was unusual and emphasizing the underlying problem of lack of
expertise:
“I think we were quite fortunate in the person who was doing the interview
because they’d worked with people with learning disabilities.” [interview 7]
The adviser went on to explain that the assessor’s experience meant that time was
taken to understand the difficulties of people with learning disabilities, contrasting
this experience with what usually happened at assessments. Although much of the
criticism by advisers was of a lack of knowledge of mental health or learning
disabilities, there were also examples of assessors lacking knowledge of physical
impairments and medical conditions:
“A lady … who’d had a gastric bypass … went for her ESA medical, asked
the doctor as soon as she went in what he knew about gastric bypasses and
he went ‘nothing, I’m actually a psychologist’, now to me that’s ludicrous to
have a psychologist sitting doing a medical examination interview when he
has no idea about the medical procedures used in the operation and/or the
effect.” [interview 9]
The Multiple Sclerosis Society has also commented on the lack of knowledge and
training of Atos assessors, arguing that assessments of people with MS require
specialists:
“Information on an application formwhich indicates that someone is seriously
affected by a long-term condition like MS (particularly if they have a
progressive form of the condition) should automatically trigger the gathering
of further information from a specialist medical professional, such as an MS
nurse.”37
Another concern about the medical assessments concerned the nature of evidence
provided directly by the claimants during the assessment. Althoughmany advisers
felt that it was important for the claimant to contribute their own evidence during
the assessment and criticised the assessors for failing to ask sufficient questions,
there was also a concern that assessors appear to ask inappropriate questions about
people’s daily lives and use it as evidence against their claim. This was explained
in more detail by two advisers:
“Adviser 1: One of the individuals had been asked what kind of things they
liked doing and they liked gardening and stuff like that, so they were put
forward that they could go and do gardening, but the type of cancer they had
in their legs, they couldn’t bend or do anything, so they actually couldn’t do
it. So because they say they like stuff then they’re automatically getting put
forward as fit for work.
Adviser 2: That’s the yes/no answer type thing, they’re not delving into
the illness or not engaging with the patient to such an extent …
Adviser 1: [they ask] ‘Can you do your garden?’
37Multiple Sclerosis Society, Work Capability Assessment Review Evidence from the MS Society (2010), p.7.
Ticking boxes: decision-making in Employment and Support Allowance 79
(2011) 18 J.S.S.L., Issue 2 © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
Adviser 2: Yeah, and [they should be saying] ‘that’s what you like but can
you do it?’ ‘no I can’t’, [then they should ask] ‘why can’t you do it?’
Adviser 1: Yeah, they’re not asking the right questions.” [interview 13]
Other advisers explained that claimants will sometimes overemphasize their abilities
because they do not wish to appear inadequate in front of the assessor and that this
problemwas particularly acute with people with mental health problems or learning
disabilities. One adviser, specialising in mental health, described an assessment
which he had attended:
“Quite often in these situations where people are in a medical interview, they
do emphasise what they can do rather than what they can’t do… So they tend
to present well, better than they would if there was a more detailed medical
assessment … somebody can hold themselves together for 15 minutes for an
interview, and then come out and collapse in a heap, you know. And I think
the people that are doing the assessments just don’t pick up on that, which
surprised me.” [interview 5]
This adviser was surprised that the medical assessor was not familiar with the
problem of “presentation” and many others also argued that a proper medical
assessment, carried out by people with the right expertise, would be able to take
account of these realities of people’s lives. An adviser gave an example of how
people are unwilling to discuss the realities of their lives when it might appear to
make them look inadequate. The assessor would ask:
“‘So what about the dog, who takes it for a walk?’ You’re not going to say
‘I open the back door and throw it out and let it come back in’ because you’re
frightened they’re going to come and take your dog away” [interview 14]
Another adviser, specializing in advising lone parents was also concerned that
they are particularly vulnerable in this respect, since their need to present themselves
as “good parents” will usually prevent them from telling the truth about the
difficulties in their lives. Advisers, whose expertise partly depended on an
understanding of the realities of benefits claimants’ lives, believed that assessors
should also have this kind of relevant expertise and awareness.
The Harrington Review considers the qualifications and experience of assessors
and, while endorsing the principles, raises concerns about assessors’ expertise in
relation to specific medical conditions, in particular mental health problems and
learning disabilities and proposes as a solution that “Atos should employ champions
in mental, intellectual and cognitive disabilities”.38 It proposes that the future
reviews should examine in more detail the qualifications of assessors and consider
whether a different “mix of professions” would be appropriate.39
These criticisms of the qualifications of assessors suggest that advisers value a
professional model of decision-making, where professionals use their relevant
professional knowledge and experience to provide evidence to make decisions
about claims. The implication is that the blanket approach to using “approved
health care professionals” is insufficient for achieving a fair outcome for claimants.
38M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.40.
39M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.46.
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The “tick box” approach to assessment
Advisers’ views of the inappropriate expertise of assessors was compounded by
a view that medical assessments were driven by “tick boxes”, referring to the
computerized form used by most medical assessors. Advisers argued that medical
assessors were clicking on boxes on the form, without adding any explanation for
their assessment and that this led to a computerized calculation of the number of
points awarded and ultimately to a refusal of benefit. They argued that a more
nuanced approach would lead to a better understanding of claimants’ difficulties.
Advisers also offered numerous examples of “mistakes” beingmade in this process,
where the assessor had apparently understood about a problem (evidenced by a
statement somewhere else on the form) but then had ticked the wrong box:
“In one respect you almost feel sympathy for the medical examiner because
they’ve got a set form that they have to follow and there seems to be no space
to give opinion. It’s ticking boxes … The paperwork then goes back to the
decision maker and they make the decision only on the basis of the score, not
on any comments.” [interview 7]
An adviser described how her own approach to helping people with claim forms
differed from the approach taken by the medical assessors:
“We’ve been trained, you know, if you ask a question and you get a response,
there’s maybe another three questions you should be asking. Whereas the
[Atos] doctor’s asking a question and it’s black and white.” [interview 13]
The adviser explained that that the “tick box” approach to assessment lacked any
element of personal contact with the claimants and that this was detrimental to an
adequate assessment:
“They basically are sitting typing a report as they’re asking, they don’t know
what they’re doing, they’re not really engaging with face to face stuff.”
[interview 13]
This aspect of the assessment was illustrated by another adviser who, when asked
how the assessments could be improved, demonstrated the problem:
“… speak to the client, not have your eyes like this [looks at computer screen]
and asking a question. … you’ve got to speak to the client, you know, and
it’s not a tick box or yes or no or takes medication, gets out of bed, you know,
stop and ask them.” [interview 14]
The use of the computer programme was addressed in a recent review of the
procedure by the DWP and consideration was given to its appropriate use. The
DWP review concluded that it was appropriate to use the “tick boxes” so long as
the more flexible “free text” on the computer system was also used.40 The
Harrington Review is cautious about the use of computer software in the medical
assessment but is unwilling to be very critical of the process, focussing instead on
improving communication with claimants. For example its main criticism of the
40DWP, Work Capability Assessment Internal Review: Report of the Working Group Commissioned by the
Department forWork and Pensions (2009), p.68. Available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/work-capability-assessment
-review.pdf [accessed December 2010].
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computer software is that the language used in reports “is not very intuitive or
accessible to claimants who receive their final report.” It goes on to recommend
that reports should include summaries written in plain English and not driven by
computerised codes.41 These recommendations may address some of the concerns
identified but are unlikely to affect the criticisms levelled by advisers that the
assessments are “driven by tick boxes”. Adler and Henman have noted that
increasing computerization of social security decision-making leads to prioritization
of a bureaucratic approach over the values found in professional decision-making.42
The Harrington Review supports these concerns about the “mechanistic”
approach to medical assessments. Although it raises the possibility that assessments
are not being carried out appropriately, it errs on the side of caution and focuses
instead on howwell decisions are communicated to claimants. Its recommendations
concentrate primarily on ensuring that claimants understand how the assessment
has been carried out, emphasizing that they should be aware of their “rights and
responsibilities” in the process.43
Advisers’ criticisms of the medical assessments, supported by the Harrington
Review, suggest that the qualities of professional decision-making, which would
help to make the procedure more trusted, are being undermined by bureaucratic
pressures to systemise and speed up the process. Harrington’s recommendations
encourage putting more of a human face on the assessments and enabling better
communicationwith claimants. There is an indication here of Adler’s “consumerist”
model of justice which emphasises the role of consumer voice in the process.44
Appeals
Moving on to looking at grievance mechanisms for dissatisfied claimants, the main
mechanism in relation to ESA is an appeal to an independent tribunal (the First-tier
Tribunal, Social Entitlement Chamber). All of the advisers interviewed had
experience of appealing decisions on ESA, with varying degrees of success. Overall,
appeals against refusal of ESA have a 40 per cent success rate,45 but advisers
reported much higher rates of success, ranging from “about 70%” to “most”. This
probably reflects the general pattern that appellants who attend their appeals have
higher levels of success than those who do not and that those who receive advice
are more successful than those who do not.46 Advisers’ view of the appeals system
was that it is a much fairer assessment of people’s circumstances because the
tribunals take account of a much wider variety of evidence. The Atos assessment
is only one strand along with the claimants’ own description of her/his condition
and any additional evidence provided bymedical professionals or support workers.
This, the advisers argued, leads to more accurate decisions. In most cases the
appeal tribunal considers all the evidence carefully, often leading to an overturning
of the decision. Advisers believed that it is the range of evidence presented at the
41M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.37.
42Cited in M. Adler, “Social Security and Social Welfare” in P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds) The Oxford Handbook
of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p406.
43M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment.
44M. Adler, “Fairness in Context”.
45DWP statistics, October 2010, Available at: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/esa_wca/esa_wca
_26102010.pdf [accessed January 2011].
46M. Adler, “Social Security and Social Welfare”.
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appeal hearing and the tribunal’s willingness to weigh up a range of possibly
conflicting evidence that makes the difference, while some believed that tribunal
members are particularly suspicious of the Atos reports:
“The appeal tribunals don’t seem to apply any weight to the medical report.
They start again and look at the claim from scratch. The medical members
in particular don’t seem to like the medical reports. That’s partly a status
thing: doctors and nurses.” [interview 1]
Some advisers gave examples of appeal tribunals which had expressed considerable
concern at the original decision, sometimes allowing the appeal without going so
far as hearing, or by awarding as many points as possible to emphasise howwrong
the initial decision had been. Although representatives tended to win most appeals,
they were very concerned at the knock-on effects on claimants. Their experience
was that appeals were taking around six to nine months to come to a hearing,
causing considerable financial worry and stress to claimants in the meantime, even
if they were successful eventually.
Appeals of course are characteristic of Mashaw’s “moral judgement” model
(and Adler’s “legal” model), where the values of due process and the independent
weighing of complex and often contradictory evidence are at the fore. This model
of justice recognises the inherent difficulty of establishing “truth” and “falsity”
and avoids the simplistic “box ticking” that the bureaucratic model favours. It is
not surprising that this model is valued by welfare rights advisers, whose training
and expertise lies in using the law to maximise claimants’ chances of success.
What is interesting here is the way in which they described their experiences at
appeals. Advisers emphasised that appeals were more likely to come to “correct”
decisions. The Harrington Review is somewhat more circumspect in its view of
tribunal decisions. Although it accepts that many tribunal decisions overturn the
original decision because they take account of a wider range of evidence, it also
implies that some tribunal decisions erroneously favour the claimant’s account at
the expense of the Atos assessment and therefore recommends that “Tribunal
decisions are better monitored.”47 Here Harrington has not appreciated the point
made byMashaw, that we should expect decisions to be made differently at appeal
level, because appellate decisions use more sophisticated techniques, taking more
careful account of competing accounts and inherently complex evidence.48 This is
appropriate at the appellate level and is useful for reconsidering difficult cases but,
Mashaw argues, a high level of appeals may suggest that the initial bureaucratic
decision-making process is not working.
Complaints
Aswell as appealing against decisions with which they are unhappy, ESA claimants
may also use complaints procedures to raise concerns about the way in which their
claim has been processed. Some of the advisers in this study had experience of
complaints procedures. Their general observation was that claimants were often
happy with the way they had been treated at the medical but then were stunned to
47M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.60.
48 J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, p.76.
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see the decision and the, all too often, award of zero points. Other claimants had
been unhappy with the assessment at the time and told advisers of bad experiences
while others described the process as humiliating. This had led some advisers to
advise clients to complain about the medical assessments but many had found
difficulty in persuading clients to do so. One adviser had been more successful in
encouraging clients to make complaints but felt that they were not taken seriously
and would in any case make no difference to the outcome of the claim. What is
clear from the administration of ESA, is that, although the complaints procedure
is available to dissatisfied claimants, it is not primarily a procedure for challenging
a decision about access to benefits and there is no apparent link between the Atos
complaints procedure and Jobcentre Plus decision-making. Advisers noted that a
complaint could lead into the decision-making process but that there is no
mechanism for this to happen at present. DWP documentation does emphasise
that complaints will be considered by DWPmedical services and that any concerns
about individual approved healthcare professionals could lead to their approval
being withdrawn.49 The Harrington Review found that there had been a relatively
low volume of complaints about the Atos assessment, but that, in a small number
of serious cases, complaints had led to the removal of professionals from the
approved list.50 The Review goes on to contrast the low level of complaints with
the concerns raised by respondents to the Review:
“The information that this review has gleaned from Atos Healthcare
concerning claimant satisfaction and complaints contrasts with the
considerable concern, worry, even anger expressed in the written evidence
to this review.”
The appropriateness of using the complaints procedure to challenge the actions of
Atos assessors raises interesting questions about the role of grievancemechanisms
in relation to different models of justice. Complaints procedures are relatively new
mechanisms for raising concerns about administrative procedures but they have
become popular since the rise of consumerism in public services and have been
hailed as opportunities for organisations to learn from their mistakes.51Adler argues
that complaints may fit within a professional model to the extent that professional
decisions may be challenged by complaining to a professional body.52 The problem
with the professional judgements made during the assessment for ESA is that the
professionals involved are heavily constrained by bureaucratic rules which leave
little room for the type of discretion and context inherent in professional
decision-making. This means that complaints under ESA are not complaints about
professionalism but are more like the consumerist complaints described by Adler
in his description of a consumerist model of justice, which stresses the role of
consumer “voice” in the process.53 Although this might enable them to have some
voice in the process, it does nothing for their entitlement to benefits.
49DWP, A Guide to Employment and Support Allowance— the Work Capability Assessment (2008), p.6. Available
at: http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/@disabled/documents/digitalasset
/dg_177366.pdf [accessed December 2010].
50M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.39.
51For further details, see J. Gulland, “Current Developments in the UK - Complaints Procedures and Ombudsmen”
in M. Adler (ed.), Administrative Justice in Context (Oxford: Hart, 2010).
52M. Adler, “Fairness in Context”.
53M. Adler, “Fairness in Context”.
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Conclusion
Since this research was carried out, the Coalition Government’s proposed welfare
reforms and budgetary cuts have increased the pressure on welfare claimants. The
planned “migration” of all claimants for Incapacity Benefit to ESA was in place
before the newGovernment was formed and pilot transfers began in October 2010.
This transfer will bring new challenges as far greater numbers of people with
longer term health problems and different expectations of their benefit entitlement
are moved into the new system.54
The Harrington Review is critical of the early implementation of ESA and
expresses disquiet about some aspects of the descriptors for the work capability
assessment and includes recommendations that they be reviewed in relation to
mental health, learning disabilities and variable conditions. However it endorses
the principle of using the WCA as a mechanism for assessing capacity for work.
Other recommendations relate, in the main, to procedural details and emphasise
improved communication with claimants as the priority.55 The recommendations
of the Review have been accepted in full by the Government and its response
suggests a more “empathetic” and “compassionate” approach. The basic principles
of the assessment are not expected to change and the response continues to use
the language of “saving” people from dependency, while implying that some claims
are bogus: “We do not wish to see people who are genuinely unable to work put
in a position where they are expected to do so”.56
The continued emphasis is on making more “accurate” decisions, implying that
it is possible to make objective assessments of people’s capacity for work, while
failing to take account of the wider social context in which people live their lives.
In the context of increased pressure on social security budgets and a discourse of
tackling “dependency” the moral framing of people claiming sickness benefits as
malingerers is unavoidable. This is not lost on claimants or their advisers, who see
quite clearly that, not only do these decisions make a significant difference to their
weekly income, but that they are also moral decisions on the extent of their
malingering. Clearly if people have “failed” an objective test, then they must have
been lying about their condition in the first place. This perception that “failing”
the work capability test is regarded as amoral failing is confirmed by the Harrington
Review, which, while showing some sympathy for claimants in this position,
framed the problem as one of “communication”, arguing that the solution is to
ensure that DWP officials explain the process better and provide better information
about the “support” available through Jobseeker’s Allowance.57
There are of course other ways in which a system for allocating social security
benefits could be devised and critics have argued that the policy obsession with
“work first” is inherently unfair on people with disabilities and long-term health
conditions.58 One possible way of avoiding this would be to establish a system of
54The research project also addressed the question of what would happen with the transfer. All interviewees
expressed concern at the effect on claimants as well as the considerable workload that this would produce, both for
themselves and for the DWP and the appeals service.
55M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment.
56DWP, Government’s Response to Professor Malcolm Harrington’s Independent Review of the Work Capability
Assessment Cm7977 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p.5, author’s emphasis.
57M. Harrington, An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment, p.33.
58C. Barnes and A. Roulstone, “‘Work’ Is a Four-Letter Word; Disability, Work and Welfare” in A. Roulstone
and C. Barnes (eds)Working Futures? Disabled People, Policy and Social Inclusion (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005).
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social security which avoids the distinction between health-related “incapacity”
or “limited capacity” for work and unemployment, as has been suggested in
discussions of single working age benefits.59 However, the most recent UK
Government proposals on reform of the benefit system maintain this distinction,
partly to enable contribution-based ESA to remain as a distinct benefit and partly
to maintain the three levels of conditionality introduced by ESA, that is, no
conditionality for the support group, limited conditionality for those with “limited
capacity for work” and full conditionality for jobseekers.60
So long as the social security system requires an assessment of capacity for
work it will have to be carried out in way which appears fair. Here models of
justice can help us to understand the criticisms of ESA decision-making. Although
the decisions about claimants’ entitlements to ESA are made by JobCentre Plus
officials (suggesting the values inherent in a bureaucratic model), they appear to
be strongly influenced by assessments made by “healthcare professionals” (which
might imply elements of a “professional” model), but these assessments are heavily
constrained by low-level bureaucratic rules which leave little room for the kind
of judgements we would expect in a professional model. Although there are some
elements of consumerism in the process, underpinned by the availability of a
complaints procedure, this inspires little confidence in claimants or their advisers,
who are concerned primarily with getting financial support, rather than being
helped along the “customer journey”.61 In a system where the power lies solely
with the decision-makers, all this can do is to scratch around at the edges of
“customer service”, leaving little in the way of justice. From a bureaucratic
perspective the process has clear advantages: using stringent, apparently objective,
criteria to distinguish between “true” and “false” claims, which, once processed
by qualified assessors, can be easily processed by administrative decision-makers,
while devaluing the evidence provided by professionals or claimants themselves.
However, it also has disadvantages if it leads to a high volume of appeals to
tribunals, which, using different criteria for assessment, overturn a high proportion
of the original decisions. This is itself a costly exercise, undermining both the
justice and the efficiency of the decision-making process as a whole. More
importantly, however, it has a significant human cost for both successful and
unsuccessful claimants.
59R. Sainsbury and R. Stephens, “A Single Core Benefit: Lessons from New Zealand” (2009) 16 J.S.S.L. 12–29.
60DWP, Universal Credit: Welfare That Works Cm.7957 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p.27. It is
interesting to note that the proposed Universal Credit will also extend conditionality to those in work who are
considered not to be earning enough or working sufficient numbers of hours and so in fact expanding the range of
people subject to assessments of capacity.
61A term used in some DWP publicity on the procedure.
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